Since many of our ancestors earned their living working in the coalmines, I have tried throughout this narrative to give the reader a variety of insights relating to their working conditions. Coalmining was always a hazardous occupation with the number of accidents increasing as the industry expanded. Yet in the early days mining accidents, although frequent aroused little concern, even deaths were infrequently recorded. The ratio of lives lost to the number employed in and around coalmines showed a steady reduction following the implementation of the various Coalmines Regulations Acts. Prior to the initial act of 1850, the average number of fatalities was one to every 233 people employed? After the act of 1908, the odds were more favourable at one in 765. According to the rules of the Ministry of Mines for the year 1924, there were 1,293 fatal accidents and 211,610 none fatal accidents, a ratio of 160 to 1. This reinforced the findings of the previous five years which recorded a similar ratio, when 5,554 fatalities and 811,398 non fatalities occurred. When one tries to comprehend these statistics, one is left with a depressive feeling of despair. There were however, thousands of people who while they may not have lost their lives in the mines, they most certainly had their lives wrecked and their life span seriously curtailed through serious accidents. If we analyse the list of fatal accidents in the Brayton Domain Collieries, we find the two major causes of death resulted from either a fall of stone from the roof or those related to the transportation of coal. These statistics mirrored the national trend, where more than half the accidents were caused by roof falls. Other types of accident were numerous, and although they rarely exceeded more than a handful in each case the multiples at the time of occurrence and the grand total of 69 recorded deaths at the time of the closure of the Brayton Domain collieries were excessive.
Although the working environment was extremely hostile, it forged a camaraderie within the various work groups of a nature normally associated with those of the battlefield. In the first instance the conditions were wet and dusty. In the second, miners worked in complete darkness except for the glow from their own individual lights. In the third, the roof was liable to collapse and required support following the removal of stone and coal. In the fourth, the perpetual danger from fire, explosion and gas. In the fifth the constant danger of flooding. And finally, the risk to life and welfare attributed by long term illness.
When accidents occurred at the face of the seam the scene was hectic. Roadways were cleared, men rushed backwards and forwards carrying stretchers and other ambulance equipment, while others attended the unfortunate victims. If the injuries were serious, medical attendants were contacted by phone and the surface manager summoned the ambulance carriage. If the accident followed an explosion the mine was cleared, awaiting the approval of a government inspector.
The majority of lives lost in the Brayton collieries occurred as a direct result of falls of stone from the roof. Obviously, miners took risks, especially when they were responsible for supplying their own materials but the situation improved after parliament forced the owners to assume their responsibilities. The character of the roof and floor of coal seams, and the inclination of the beds varied considerably in different and even the same seam, making it extremely difficult to establish a standard procedure for setting supports. Timbers would often bend or break under the constant strain of the diverse collection of fractures, breaks or slips inherent in the strata. While large stones could wreak havoc by falling between and over the randomly spaced stays. In 1909, the Royal Commission of Mines finally addressed the dangers associated with the withdrawal of timbers. They recognised the need for increased supervision and recommended the use of specially designed equipment. Despite this advice, John Sandwith (1909), Henry Sandwith (1910), and John Holden (1914), were all killed as a direct result of drawing props with tomahawks. Fifteen years later, men continued to die; William Beattie, a 51-year-old Deputy, was using a Tomahawk to withdraw a batch of props from a ‘place’, when an area of roof 20 feet long and 15 feet wide, collapsed and buried him. Even when warnings were given lives were still lost. In 1924 Storey Stamper and Bill Blackett, were hewing coal in an old working, close to the base of the shaft. Both heard the rumblings from the roof. Both men began to run, Blackett was lucky, he collided with a prop, Storey was not so fortunate, he was buried alive. Should someone survive an initial fall other hazards awaited. In 1878, after 68-year-old Benjamin Sanderson, was seriously injured by a fall of stone; it took the relief team over one hour to extricate him from the workings, then a further 75 minutes to convey him to his home. Despite surviving the three-mile torturous journey in a heavily constructed hay lined cart he died from shock, a few hours later, after undergoing an operation to amputated a limb.
A considerable number of accidents occurred to those workers employed to handle the tubs for conveying coal underground. The most notorious place was the face, where ‘runaway’ tubs often escaped down steep inclines. In July 1924, James Hodgson, a 23-year-old ‘pony putter’, died after he was struck by a train of runaway tubs. At other locations accidents occurred to those travelling upon the conveyancers. The majority of these incidents recorded men either falling between the tubs, or those who came into contact with the roof or sides of the roadway. Not that accidents were restricted to the underground worker; surface workers were also at risk. In 1884, a young pony minder, named William Johnstone was conveying coal when his coat became entangled in a revolving shaft, dragging him into the appliance and mangling his body. In 1904, Bill Cameron, a blacksmith employed at No 4 pit, was fatally crushed by buffers after crossing the line between two sets of shunting wagons.
Explosions in mines were caused by the presence of (1) firedamp, (2) firedamp and coal-dust together, and (3) coal-dust. Explosions caused by the accumulation of firedamp at Aspatria were rare but when they occurred as was the case at No 4 pit, on 20 April 1915, the number of fatalities was devastating. At 4 am, after searching the workings for gas, deputy William Dand, with three groups of eight men working under him, declared the area safe. The workers began walking the 1.5 miles to the face. One team consisted of father and son James and Henry Wilkinson; Thomas Birney and his nephew Thomas Harris; half brothers, Paul Rayson and Robert Lightfoot; Thomas Little; and shot firer Joseph Rumney. Although undercut, the hard face remained difficult to hew; as such a decision was taken to weaken the rock using explosives. Dand returned to the workings, inspected for gas, found none and fifteen minutes later authorised the shot. The men were aware that coalfaces were notoriously gassy places and Harris the driller took the added precaution of boring a shallow hole to accommodate the charge.
At 11 am. Rumney fired the fateful charge, which penetrated the surrounding area and ignited an accumulation of firedamp. A sheet of flames burst through the locality wrapping the eight workers in its scorching embrace. As there were no combustible material present the inferno was instantly muzzled, but not before the men had been severely burnt. First Aid was immediately administered at the scene and the injured were quickly transported up the shaft and conveyed under medical attendance to their homes in the company ambulance. Later that evening George Askew; Thomas Hillary and a government inspector from Whitehaven examined the workings. When no serious damage was found, work resumed on the following morning. The men were all nursed and died in their own beds; no one was taken to hospital. Under the treatment available today there is every possibility that all of the men would have survived. As it was death followed slowly. The first to succumb was 20-year-old Robert Lightfoot. Henry Wilkinson, aged 32, followed 26 hours later. The third was 64 years old Thomas Birney, who died early on the Sunday morning; Thomas Little, a 29-year-old single man, struggled for a further 36 hours. Later that day Paul Rayson, aged 25, became the fifth victim. On the following Friday, 60-year-old James Wilkinson’s lingering came to an end. On June 5th, six weeks after the incident the death toll came to an end with the demise of Joseph Rumney, the 51-year-old head of a large family. At the inquest held on 18 June, many searching questions were raised relating to the wisdom of firing that shot. The jury agreed that neither Rumney nor Dand had knowingly endangered the lives of their comrades. The cause of death by burning from the explosion was reported.
One of the most common form of accident to fall into the miscellaneous category occurred to shaft sinkers. When contractors were sinking the shaft at Brayton Knowe pit; George Bell, 19-year-old son of the main contractor, died after falling down the shaft. Others occurred through equipment failure. In January 1875, a workman at No 3 pit, lost control of a revolving handle on a lifting crane, which struck him on the thigh, causing a compound fracture; death occurred some days later. Accidents also occurred at the surface in connection with both coal cleaning and the loading of apparatus. On the colliery railway sidings, coke ovens and in the repair shops, accidents were frequent. As operations became more sophisticated and electricity played a significant role, then related accidents, often in the form of electric shocks and the ignition of combustible material became more frequent. In 1904, Billy Henderson died after being severely scalded after walking in the path of an exploding steam pipe. No individual, notwithstanding his status was exempt from accident. In 1924, John Stoddart, an Overman at No 5 pit, was the last of six officials to enter the cage prior to descent. He moved forward at the same time as the cage moved downwards, and he fell between the cage and the side of the shaft, a distance of 1,066 feet. The winding engineman later explained that he heard someone shout, and he interpreted the sound as an instruction to lower the cage. The Banksman whose duty it was to give the signal was adamant that he was blameless. Thomas Eadie, manager, Joseph Harris, owner and George Askew, agent, were each charged with having failed to comply with the general codes of signalling. Notwithstanding the guilty verdict, they were each fined £2. In 1904, an 18-year-old youth named Joseph Wilson, died from blood poisoning, thirteen days after working his shift, having the presence of a piece of coal lodged between his instep and the inside of his clog. In May 1908, a similar fate awaited 27-year-old, Isaac Hodgson. He was blasting a hole, when a lump of coal splintered and struck him on the leg. Although not causing serious injury, he died from blood poisoning, five weeks later in the Carlisle Fever Hospital.
In the early days of mining contagious, non-contagious and other related diseases were never considered a permanent threat to the health and welfare of the miner and in consequences never appeared among the statistics. If we consult a contemporary text book, we find a sole reference to a complaint called Ankylostomiasis, a contagious disease brought about by the spread of worms, which infested the bowels of humans. In reality incidents of this type were rare in Cumberland coalfields. Meanwhile the effects of none contagious diseases, such as long-term respiratory illness, body disfiguration and blackening of the skin went unrecorded.
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